A Boston law firm landed on a ransomware leak site over the weekend. Ransomware.live indexed Reed & Giordano, P.A. (reedgiordano.com) as a claimed victim of the Rhysida ransomware group at 2026-10-11 15:28 UTC (about 11:28 a.m. ET Sunday), with an estimated attack date of the same day.
The firm's site describes securities, commercial and civil litigation, contracts and transactions, employment, IP, real estate, and related counsel, with a Boston contact number (617) 723-7755 and an address at 177 State Street / One McKinley Square. The public site was up (HTTP 200) when we checked Monday morning.
What's claimed, and what's confirmed
Claimed: Rhysida has listed Reed & Giordano on its leak site. The group's own post, as mirrored by trackers, alleges roughly 94,604 files / ~51.3 GB and describes categories such as IOLTA / client-trust banking instructions, wire details, tax forms with SSNs, Massachusetts driver's licenses, and related client-money flows. Those are actor assertions. They are not a forensic inventory and they are not a confirmation that any of that material left the firm.
Not confirmed: We found no statement from the firm, no news report, and no regulator or bar filing tied to this listing. There is no confirmed encryption, no confirmed theft of client or firm data, no reported case-management outage, and no word on payment. Leak sites are pressure tools. Groups invent, inflate, and mislabel data. Treat every category on the listing as unverified until the firm or a regulator says otherwise.
Why it matters to law firms and professional services
Even a small firm holds trust-account instructions, wire details, tax IDs, medical or employment files from litigation, and e-filing credentials. That mix is exactly what criminals want for identity theft and invoice fraud — and exactly what clients will ask about the hour a headline hits.
Southeast practices in Rome, Atlanta, Chattanooga, and Birmingham run the same stack: Microsoft 365, a practice-management and billing system, a bank portal for IOLTA or operating accounts, and outside vendors with remote access. The fastest damage after a leak-site post is often not encryption. It is a fake "updated wire instructions" email to a client or opposing counsel.
Clear takeaway
Treat the Rhysida claim against Reed & Giordano as a drill for every lean law office. Assume clients will see the headline. Know who speaks for the firm, where the clean backups are, and how you will verify any trust-account or wire change by phone — no matter what a leak site alleges.
Actions to take this week
- Turn on MFA for every attorney and staff account in Microsoft 365 / Google Workspace, practice management, e-filing, and bank portals.
- Check leaked-credential exposure for your domain and force resets on anything that shows up, starting with partners, finance, and IT admins.
- Confirm backups you can restore of matter files, billing, and email — with one copy that cannot be changed or deleted. Test a restore this month.
- Inventory vendor and remote access (IT, bookkeeping, e-discovery, document vendors). Remove shared logins; give each helper a named account with MFA.
- Tell clients and counterparties now: you will never change wire or trust-account instructions by email alone. Any change gets a call-back to a known number.
- Write a one-page incident card: who leads, who calls your carrier and IT provider, and how you'll reach clients if email is down.
Brotherly Technology helps law firms, professional-services practices, and SMBs across Rome, Northwest Georgia, and the Southeast turn ransomware headlines into a short continuity review — MFA, backups, vendor access, and payment-change call-backs. If you want a second set of eyes before the next claim lands, give us a call.
Sources:
- Ransomware.live: Reed & Giordano PA / Rhysida. Discovered 2026-10-11 15:28 UTC; est. attack date 2026-10-11; actor-side file-count and data-category claims; claim-level only.
- Reed & Giordano, P.A. (reedgiordano.com). Firm context: Boston securities, litigation, and related counsel. No incident acknowledgment cited here.
- Reed & Giordano: Contact. Address and phone context only; not an incident statement.